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DWORKIN, HART, AND THE PROBLEM OF 









The following article analyzes the dispute between legal philosophers Ronald Dworkin and 
H.L.A Hart over the nature of legal rights. The author argues that central to this dispute is a 
pervasive methodological problem of social theory, the ''problem of theoretical perspective." 
He makes use of a distinction between "internal" and "external" perspectives to defend what 





Since its publication in England in 1961, H.L.A. Hart's The 
Concept of Law has aroused the antagonism of America's leading 
legal philosophers. Undoubtedly the most persistent of the 
antagonists has been Ronald Dworkin, Hart's successor to the Chair 
of Jurisprudence at Oxford University and a legal philosopher with 
an exceptionally high "recognition factor" on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Dworkin's interest in the central theses of The Concept of 
Law has lasted for over fifteen years, and his repeated attempts to 
define and def end his disagreements with them constitute the core of 
his contribution to legal philosophy. 
In philosophical terms, the controversy is a "conceptual" one, about 
the "nature" of legal rights. Such disputes are sometimes dismissed as 
mere "terminological debates," quibbles about the proper use of 
words, something the more practical-minded solve by stipulation so 
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they can get on with the real business of research and evaluation. 
(Criminologists will recall the debates about the "meaning" of "crime," 
that is whether it includes all "deviance" or just "illegal" deviance.) Of 
course, the problem with characterizing conceptual disputes in this way 
is that it fails to account for their intensity and the intellectual rigor 
with which they are often carried on, unless  recourse is had to often 
fantastic and ultimately unsatisfying theories about the supposed 
pathological motives of the disputants.1 
In fact, conceptual debates have a deeper level of significance of 
which the terminological question is only the surface. The one between 
Dworkin and Hart, as I hope to demonstrate, is actually about nothing 
less than what is important in the study of law as a branch of social 
theory. To ask the nature of legal rights in this context is in fact to 
ask what about legal rights matters-what is worthy of attention and 
inquiry, whether empirical, moral, political, or historical. It is even to 
ask who counts out of all the possible social actors and to whose 
concerns attention should be given in the understanding of legal rights. 
It has recently become easier to appreciate and, I believe, to 
resolve the Dworkin/Hart controversy at this level because, in a flurry of 
recent writings, Dworkin (1977a: 58-84; 1977b; 1977c; 1977d: 279-290, 
appendix to paperback ed., 291-368) has directed his mind to 
methodological questions and has finally hit upon what I conceive to 
be the central issue between Hart and himself. This is what I shall 
call "the problem of theoretical perspective," a pervasive 
 
methodological problem of social theory fundamental to the philosophy 
of law. It can be brought out in the following way. 
It is a familiar feature of human, not merely academic, experience 
that people disagree. They disagree not only over questions of 
morality (for example, should the police be allowed to break the law 
for reasons of "national security"?) and questions of fact (for 
example, did the police break the law?), but also over the proper 
characterization of events, enterprises, and institutions (for example, 
when the police break the law in order to disrupt radical political 
groups, can they be said to be breaking the law for reasons of 
"national security"?). Often this latter sort of disagreement seems to 
depend not on some error on the part of one of the disputants, but 
rather on their different perspectives (for example, the police ''view" 
of "national security" vs. the radical view). Both sides seem right, 
though only partially right and, therefore, partially wrong. It depends 
on the way you look at it, we might want to say.  
But what should the approach of the social theorist be to the 
object of this sort of dispute (assuming it is worth theorizing about 
in the first place)? From whose perspective is it to be represented? Is 
one superior to all others? How is this to be decided? Or should 
everybody's perspective be included? How can this be done? Do the 
perspectives of the disputants, or indeed any of the participants, 
exhaust the perspectives available to the theorist, or can there be a 
distinct "theoretical" perspective? 
This, then, is the problem of theoretical perspective. It arises as 
an issue between Dworkin and Hart in the context of "hard" or 
"controversial" legal cases. Dworkin points out that lawyers often 
argue and judges often reason as if there were a single right answer 
to a question of law, even when there is no statute or binding 
decision which clearly governs the case at hand and even when there 
is a deep division in the legal community as to what the answer is. 
They may disagree over the answer, but they seem to agree (at 
least if one restricts reference to official statements in briefs, oral 
argument, and reasons for judgment) that there is an answer. They 
assume, in other words, that there can be and are legal rights and 
duties in controversial cases. More or less because of this, Dworkin 
takes the same position. On the other hand, Hart argues in The 
Concept of Law that legal rights and duties exist only when they 
are manifestly accepted by the bulk of the relevant community, in the 
sense that they flow either from rules which are themselves  accepted  
or from rules which  are valid according to other, accepted rules (see 
Hart, 1961: Ch. IV-VI). This seems to exclude them from 
controversial cases for the very reason that there is a controversy. 
This will be so even though there may be agreement in the 
community on the question of whether there is a right answer, as long 
as there is disagreement  about  what  the  answer  actually is.  Thus, 
Dworkin seems to adopt a view that is consistent and Hart a view 
that is inconsistent with that of the participants.  Of course, Dworkin 
 
will disagree with some, perhaps all, of them over what the answer is, 
but Hart seems to disagree with all of them over whether there is an 
answer at all. To complicate matters further, each of these positions 
comes to us as an analysis of the concepts of law, legal right, legal 
duty, etc. 
The most direct way out of this entanglement, it seems to me, 
would be to say that Dworkin is concerned with the concepts of legal 
right and legal duty as questions of law, viewed internally, from 
within a given legal system, and that Hart is concerned with them 
as questions about law, viewed externally , from outside any given 
legal system. This dichotomy of perspective between "internal" and 
"external" would be similar, but not identical, to the familiar 
dichotomies of theory/practice and official/unofficial.2 The difference 
would be that while Dworkin's concerns correspond to official theory, 
Hart's include both official theory and unofficial practice. A spatial 
metaphor seems appropriate to distinguish between the worlds of the 
"insiders" (the legal profession, lawyers, and judges using their 
special techniques of argumentation and justification) who make up 
Dworkin's reference group and the "outsiders" (everyone else) who 
also figure in Hart's system. We might further mark the distinction 
by calling Dworkin's concerns the "lawyer's" concerns or the 
concerns of legal ''theory," represented by the question, "What is the 
law?" and Hart's concerns the "philosopher's" concerns or the 
concerns of legal ''philosophy," represented by the question, "What is 
law?" Having thus marked out these distinct (though partially 
overlapping) terrains, we could then ask whether either Dworkin or 
Hart told us something true and valuable, though we would hardly 
call any differences between them a "debate," or even a 
"disagreement," any more than we would say that there was a 
"disagreement" between the watchmaker and the philosopher over 
the nature of time.3 
The problem with this way of resolving matters is that, if it were 
correct, it would not look very good for Dworkin, who has proceeded 
all along on the basis that there is a genuine disagreement between 
Hart and himself and, in any event, has tried to demonstrate that 
Hart's view of legal rights in controversial cases is wrong, not just 
different. Now there are two ways in which Dworkin could resist 
this unfortunate (for him) resolution of the controversy. On the one 
hand, he could argue that, based on a proper interpretation of The 
Concept of Law, Hart really meant to view rights in controversial 
cases from the same internal-question-of-law perspective that he 
(Dworkin) does. For reasons which will appear below, this argument 
is not really available. Failing this, Dworkin could argue that 
whatever perspective Hart meant to adopt, the only one that he 
could adopt would be an internal one, because there is no external 
perspective. At least where legal rights in controversial cases are 
concerned, the question for the philosopher can be no different from 
the question for the lawyer. Legal philosphy is co-extensive here with 
 
legal theory, and the answer to the question "What is law?" is 
exhausted by the answer to the question "What is the law?" 
Dworkin has begun to mount this second defense in his most 
recent writings. Although he has not yet attempted to generalize  it  
beyond  the  question  of  legal  rights  in controversial cases, it is in 
fact impossible to stop it there. At the  very  least, it entails the  
exclusion  of  any external perspective from the concepts of law, legal 
right, and legal duty altogether. But it threatens to lead even further, 
to the point where legal philosophy is swallowed up entirely by legal 
theory, at which its only concerns are the lawyer's concerns with 
internal questions of law. We have, in effect, a bid for conceptual 
monopoly by the legal profession. By "taking rights seriously," 
Dworkin really means us to take lawyers seriously. I will argue here 
that Dworkin fails in his attempt to exclude all external perspectives 
from the concept of law. In doing so, I will defend what I consider 
to be Hart's more fully social theory of law. This is important for 
scientific, moral, and political reasons shortly to be outlined. But it is 
also crucial for legal philosophy itself. Indeed, though this may seem 
curious at this point, the main reason why Dworkin fails is 
precisely the importance of an external perspective for the enterprise 
of philosophizing about law. 
 
II. DWORKIN' S VIEW OF RIGHTS IN CONTROVERSIAL 
CASES 
Dworkin's first explicit consideration of the problem of 
theoretical perspective can be found in the two contemporaneously 
published essays, "No Right Answer" and "Can Rights be 
Controversial?" Now most of the discussion in both of these essays 
is taken up with the issue of whether there can be rights in 
controversial cases as an internal question of law. Dworkin argues 
that it would be both logically 
possible and rational for a legal system to so provide in its 
"ground rules." Consequently the claim that there cannot be legal 
rights in controversial cases, when "construed as a claim within the 
enterprise" is false. I do not propose to review these arguments, as I 
believe them to be correct and nothing turns on them for present 
purposes. Dworkin also argues, though much less elaborately, that 
the ground rules of "our own legal system" (by which, apparently, he 
means the legal systems of the United States and Great Britain; see 
1977b: 32) do provide for rights in controversial cases and that we 
should expect all "modern, developed, and complex legal systems" 
to do so (1977a: 84). Consequently the claim that there are not legal 
rights in controversial cases again when construed as a claim within 
the enterprise , is also false. Here Dworkin relies largely on a 
theory most fully developed in his own "Hard Cases" (see 1975: 1057; 
also 1977d: 81-30). Again, I believe that he is largely correct in this 
contention, though the specific theory offered in "Hard Cases" would 
seem to need much more research as a description  of  the  way  
 
judges  characteristically  justify decisions and much more 
argument as a "normative" theory about the way they should make 
them. In any event, nothing turns on this either for present purposes. 
Dworkin's third and final contention, the one that puts him in 
direct contradiction with Hart and which raises the issue with 
which I am· concerned, is made toward the end of each essay. It is 
that the claim that rights cannot or do not exist in controversial 
cases must be construed as a claim made from within the 
enterprise: "We can only make sense of ( a] philosopher's claim if 
we take it to report the special truth conditions of an enterprise" 
(1977d: 289). ''The philosopher's claim . . . is a claim that can only 
be made from within the enterprise" ( 1977a: 81; 1977b: 28). 
In "No Right Answer" this final thesis is put forward in the form 
of an allegory about "a group of Dickens scholars" convened ''to 
discuss David Copperfield as if David were a real person" (1977a: 73). 
In "Can Rights be Controversial?" this literary community becomes a 
convention of judges determined to apply the theory of judicial 
decision making Dworkin advanced in "Hard Cases," summarized as 
follows: 
A proposition of law may be asserted as true if it is more consistent with 
the theory of law that best justifies settled law than the contrary proposition 
of law. It may be denied as false if it is less consistent with that theory of law 
than the contrary (1977d: 283). 
It will simplify matters if we accept provisionally that this is an 
accurate account of "our own legal system" and resolve Dworkin's 
literary club and judicial convention into an actual community of 
judges carrying on their daily work. 
Dworkin supposes that the legal community is visited by a 
philosopher who subscribes to the "demonstrability thesis." 
This thesis states that if a proposition cannot be demonstrated to be true, 
after all the hard facts that might be relevant to its truth are either known 
or stipulated, then it cannot be true. By "hard facts" I mean physical facts 
and facts about behaviour (including the thoughts and attitudes) of people. By 
"demonstrated" I mean backed by arguments such that anyone who 
understood the language in which the proposition is formed must assent to its 
truth or stand convicted of irrationality (1977a: 76). 
This philosopher, sometimes referred to as an "empiricist 
philosopher" (1977a: 78), because he is supposed to subscribe to "a 
strict form of empiricism in metaphysics" (1977a; 77), proceeds to 
tell the legal community that "they have ade a very serious 
mistake"-that in assuming the existence of rights in controversial 
cases, they are accepting a "myth" (1977d: 283). It is a myth even 
though it conforms to the ground rules of their enterprise, because 
any enterprise with such ground rules must be "based on an illusion" 
(1977a: 81). The members of the community, says Dworkin, will 
properly reject the philosopher's remonstrances for a number of 
reasons. 
In the first place, the enterprise "succeeds" in the sense that 
the participants are in fact capable of making judgments about the 
right answer to controversial cases, the very judgments which the 
philosopher claims are "mistaken" (1977a: 78-79). In the second 
 
place, if the philosopher is persuaded to undergo legal training and 
then take up a position on the bench, "he will find that he himself 
will be able to form judgments of the sort he believes rest on 
mistake" (1977d:283). He will in fact have beliefs about the answers 
to controversial cases, and he will be able to provide reasons for 
them. "So the philosopher' s own capacities will embarrass him" 
(1977d: 284; see also 1977a: 79). Third, if he then claims that he has 
merely been "seduced" by the training and that an untrained 
"independent observer" would find it impossible to make such 
judgments, the participants will properly doubt whether he (the 
independent observer) has the capacity to judge their debates 
because it is "neither surprising nor relevant" that an untrained 
person is "incompetent" to make such complicated judgments 
(1977d: 284). Finally, if the philosopher claims that the illusion of 
the enterprise is the supposition that the judgments made by the 
participants are judgments about "the external world,'' they will 
answer that they never made any such supposition, that the 
enterprise does not seek "to increase our knowledge of the external 
world" but rather to fulfill a different sort of purpose (1977a: 81). 
It is the enterprise which gives sense to their judgments; and if the 
enterprise serves a worthwhile purpose and does so better than a 
revised form of the enterprise, that is all it is designed to do. These 
are not the only elements of the dialogue between the philosopher 
and the judges, but they are the main ones. The important thing to 
note about them is the iron conceptual control which Dworkin 
accords to the enterprise itself. This is symbolized by the situation of 
the entire exchange on the judges' "turf." In order to make his claim 
even intelligible here, the philosopher must respect the enterprise's 
own purposes, limits, and conventions. Indeed, the only possible 
sense which the judges are able to make of the philosopher's claim, 
if he is not to be taken as reporting the ground rules of the judicial 
enterprise at hand (or of some other actual judicial enterprise), is to 
interpret it as calling for the reform of the enterprise, which in this 
context must mean a change in the ground rules governing 
controversial cases. Thus, instead of making his claim at large, as 
philosophers usually do, the philosopher directs his claim to the 
judges: " . . . we may take it as a claim external to all such 
enterprises, as a claim about facts of the real world which judges . . 
. must in the end respect" (1977d: 284; emphasis added). He asks 
them to alter their practice , because their practice is said to be 
based on an illusion. Yet the philosopher can come up with no 
concrete reform, and, so says Dworkin: "If no reform would be 
justified, what is the illusion?" (1977a: 80-81). 
With this, Dworkin sends the philosopher packing. The claim that 
there are no legal rights in controversial cases must be construed as a 
claim made from within the enterprise and, for reasons given earlier, 
must therefore be false. The external perspective either does not exist 
or, in what amounts to the same thing, has no bearing on the concepts 
 
of legal right, legal duty, or, presumably, any other questions of legal 
philosophy. 
 
III. HART AND THE "EXTERNAL POINT OF VIEW" 
Dworkin has left very little elbow room for the philosopher 
wishing to deny that there can be legal rights in controversial cases. 
He or she must cast the claim as either a report of the ground rules 
of an enterprise or a call for their reform. In the first case the 
philosopher' s claim is false. In the second, it calls for a change from a 
system in which the judge is to strive for the right answer (conceded 
to exist) to one in which the judge is to forsake the quest (though the 
right answer is still conceded to exist) at the first sign of controversy 
and either deny the claim or exercise his or her "discretion." This 
seems silly. 
But why should we think that philosophers who deny that there can 
be legal rights in controversial cases want to make either of these 
types of claims? If we take Hart to be a representative philosopher 
who adheres to a version of the "demonstrability thesis" (in the 
sense that his concept of law is constructed entirely of what 
Dworkin calls "hard facts"), we see immediately that these concerns 
are not his. For one thing, if there is any reformism in The Concept 
of Law, it is theoretical, not legal, reformism. On the vecy first page 
of the book, Hart declares that it is "concerned with the clarification 
of the general framework of legal thought, rather than with the 
criticism of law or legal policy" (1961: vii); and evecy following page 
bears this out. One would search The Concept of Law in vain if one 
hoped to find anything resembling the dialogue Dworkin sets up 
between the philosopher and the judges. 
Second, only by ignoring a central distinction in his book could 
one conclude that Hart intended his concept of law to do no more 
than report the ground rules of legal systems. I am referring to the 
distinction between the "internal" and "external" "aspect," "attitude," 
or ''point of view," which is at least as close to the core of Hart's 
theory as the distinction between primacy and secondary rules. 
According to Hart, the concept of law, like the concept of a rule, 
involves a combination of these two aspects, each as essential as the 
other. 
The external aspect of a rule, it will be remembered, is the mere 
regularity of behavior which is common to both rules and "habits" 
(1961: 55-56). And the external attitude is the attitude of those "who 
are only concerned with (the rules) when and because they judge 
that unpleasant consequences are likely to follow violation" (1977a: 
88). Of course, Hart was not the advocate, in The Concept of Law, of 
the external point of view. On the contrary, this was the tradition he 
received from, among others, Austin and Holmes and which he 
sought to revise. If one conceptualized law with Austin in terms of 
"commands" and "habits of obedience" or with Holmes as 
''prophecies of what the courts will do in fact," one would not only 
 
miss an important feature of the way law operates in the lives of 
many, perhaps most, people, but one would also be at a loss to explain 
certain salient features of law, if not how law could exist at all. 
Yet Hart did not seek to abolish the external point of view, merely 
to supplement it with an internal one. The internal point of view 
or attitude is that of those who regard legal rules not merely as a 
prediction of what might befall them if they behave in a certain 
fashion, but as accepted standards of behavior to which they 
conform for other reasons and to which they demand conformity in 
others. The internal attitude has to exist because there has to be 
somebody concerned with the rules for nonpredictive reasons; 
otherwise the rules would not be applied to nonconformity and could 
hardly be said to exist at all. So where one has law, one will have 
the internal attitude, at least on the part of officials and perhaps, but 
not necessarily, on the part of others. But where one has law, one will 
just as necessarily have the external attitude, for without it law would 
have neither purpose nor effect: 
At any given moment the life of any society which lives by rules, legal or not, 
is likely to consist in a tension between those who, on the one hand, accept 
and voluntarily co-operate in maintaining the rules, and so see their own and 
other persons' behaviour in terms of the rules, and those who, on the other 
hand, reject the rules and attend to them only from the external point of view 
as a sign of possible punishment. One of the difficulties facing any legal 
theory anxious to do justice to the complexity of the facts is to remember the 
presence of both these 
points of view and not to define one of them out of existence (1977a: 
88). 
It is necessary to distinguish here between what Hart calls the 
"external point of view" and what I have been calling the "external 
perspective." For Hart, the "external point of view" is not intended to 
represent a theoretical perspective distinct from the perspective of 
the participants in the enterprise, but rather to reflect faithfully the 
perspective of one representative group of those participants. In order 
to "do justice to the complexity of the facts" the concept of law has 
to include the perspective of both representative groups, internal and 
external attitude holders. But the point is that in doing so it can 
wholly conform to neither. And it is this which logically entails for 
Hart a distinct theoretical perspective, the "external perspective" in 
the sense in which I have been using it. 
Dworkin, of course, faces no such predicament, because he 
restricts his view to internal attitude holders only. His frame of 
reference is the official realm of lawyers arguing points of law and 
judges justifying their decisions. There is no room here for an 
external attitude (in Hart's sense). And unless one admits of such 
an external attitude, which must then be reconciled somehow with 
the internal attitude, there is no need for the philosopher to adopt 
an external perspective (in my sense). 
Moreover, it is with the inclusion of an external attitude and 
the adoption of an external perspective that the concept of law 
necessarily becomes more than just a "report" of the official ground 
 
rules of legal systems. Those with the external attitude are 
concerned with "what the courts do in fact," not merely with what 
official theory says that they ought to do. 
IV. OTHER CRITICS OF HART'S WORK 
Dworkin is not the first of Hart's critics to attempt to define the 
external perspective  "out of existence."  In an essay entitled 
"Revolutions and Continuity of Law,'' J.M. Finnis (1973: 44-76) did 
much the same thing, though in a rather more selfconscious and 
deliberate manner. Finnis approached  the question indirectly, as a 
critique of the quality of Hart's internal attitude. For Finnis, it was not 
enough to exclude from this attitude the attitudes of those who 
"regard the law as a reason for acting simply out of one's short-term 
self-interest in avoiding sanctions" (1973: 73)-that is to say, who 
regard the law purely predictively-while leaving in virtually every 
other motive (for example, "mere wish to do as others do,'' "an 
unrefiecting inherited or traditional attitude," and "calculations of 
long-term self-interest") : 
Once one abandons, with Hart, the bad man's concerns as the criterion of 
relevance in legal philosophy, there proves to be little reason for stopping 
short of accepting the morally concerned man's concerns as that criterion . . 
. . There is no distinct "theoretical purpose" of the "scientific observer" 
which could be set over against the "practical purposes" that the (mature 
man] has in drawing the boundaries of concepts by using them in his life in 
society (1973:74-75). 
So Finnis concluded that "law can only be fully understood as it is 
understood by . . .those who accept it as a specific type of moral 
reason for acting" (1973: 74). 
Of course, this would be the natural position for Finnis to adopt, 
given the concrete question he was seeking to answernamely, what 
the ethical duties of citizens were in relation to the laws of the old 
and new regimes after a coup d 'etat had taken place. But he 
himself seems to have recognized that there could be other sorts of 
questions that were the concern of legal philosophy when he wrote: 
"Analytical jurisprudence is intrinsically subalternated either to 
history or to ethics or to both, and cannot be an independent 
discipline, with a viewpoint of its own" (1973:72). Now if there can be 
other sorts of questions, it is not unreasonable to suppose that there 
might also be other perspectives. And, if we take "history" to stand 
for the other social sciences (as I think we can, in the context in 
which Finnis mentioned it), including sociology, we might find it 
interesting to recall that Hart described The Concept of Law as "an 
essay in descriptive sociology" (1961: vii). We might also want to 
recall that though, as Finnis pointed out, Hart did abandon the "bad 
man" as "the criterion of relevance in legal philsophy,'' he did not 
abandon him as a criterion. Was he wrong not to have done so? Finnis 
was correct when he suggested that analytical jurisprudence could 
not stand on its own, and for this reason he was also correct to 
reject as an argument for his specific solution to the problem of 
revolution that it might conform to "the ordinary man's point of 
 
view" or a "general consensus of lay and professional opinion" 
(1973: 65). There seems no reason for the philosopher to bother with 
analysis as an end in itself-that is to say, for the sake of identifying 
usage. As C.H. Whiteley has pointed out, this "is the job of 
lexicographers" (1969: 6). Indeed, if this were not the case one would 
be hardpressed to find a criterion by which to rule out such 
familiar and well-established usages as those of Austin and 
Holmes. So, to quote Whiteley's pithy prose again, one cannot 
answer the question of whether an analysis is adequate "until one 
knows what purpose the analysis is to be adequate for" (1969: 7).4 
A good example of the relevance of pwpose to analysis can be 
found in The Concept of Law (1961: 202-207) itself in the context 
of the well-known debate between Hart and Lon L. Fuller on the 
conceptual connection between law and morals. Fuller had argued, 
in effect, that some "laws" were so morally iniquitous that they were 
not law at all. In other words, he would have excluded from the 
concept of law those norms which had all the attributes of law 
except moral acceptability. Hart rejected this position in favor of a 
"wider" concept which included morally iniquitous laws, but he did 
not do so on the "purely analytical" ground that this wider concept 
better comported with "ordinary English usage," which was not 
entirely clear in any event. Instead, he argued for the wider 
concept on prudential grounds. First, nothing was to be gained and 
much lost in ''the theoretical or scientific study of law as a social 
phenomenon" if the narrower concept were adopted; it was more 
rational to study together the use and abuse of a specific method 
of social control than to split it up into two different disciplines. 
Second, in order that people would be better equipped to resist 
iniquitous rules, "they should preserve the sense that the certification 
of something as legally valid is not conclusive of the question of 
obedience." Finally, ''to withhold legal recognition from iniquitous 
rules may grossly oversimplify the variety of moral issues to which 
they give rise" (as in the case under discussion of a person who 
relied on a norm which was enforced at the time but was later 
retroactively declared invalid on the grounds of moral iniquity). The 
merits of the Hart-Fuller debate are not, of course, a issue here. In 
fact, both were arguing "externally" in that neither of them regarded 
the internal ground rules of any actual legal system as the final test 
of the question which they were debating. Nevertheless, as will 
shortly be seen, there are strong similarities between the Hart-Fuller 
debate and the Dworkin-Hart debate. More important for now is 
Hart's purposive approach to analysis and the question of whether it 
can be applied to the problem of theoretical perspective and, in 
particular, to the question of rights in controversial cases. 
 
V. BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE 
We might begin by asking how the trouble with rights in 
controversial cases arose in the first place. It will be remembered 
 
that Dworkin began the first of his series of pieces on the subject, 
"The Model of Rules," (1967; also 1977d) under the heading of 
"Embarrassing Questions."5 It seems that even then Dworkin 
considered the most "embarrassing" feature of the prevailing 
"positivist" (Hartian) theory of law to be its treatment of the 
controversial case. As I pointed out earlier, Hart adopted what 
might be called a "wait and see" approach to the controversial case 
in the sense that unless or until the behavior of the relevant 
(judicial) community manifested acceptance of a rule providing for 
the right in question, it could not be said to exist. According to 
Dworkin, this meant that where no settled rule clearly governed the 
case, a judge would have to decide the matter by exercising his or 
her "discretion" (1967: 31-39). What "embarrassed" about this state 
of affairs was its retroactivity: 
[If we accept the positivist thesis], we must acknowledge that the murderer's 
family in Riggs 6 and the manufacturer in Henningsen 7 were deprived of their 
property by an act of judicial discretion applied ex post facto. This may not 
shock many readers-the notion of judicial discretion has percolated through 
the legal community-but it does illustrate one of the most nettlesome of the 
puzzfes that drive  philosophers to worry about legal obligation. If taking 
property away in cases like these cannot be justified by appealing to an 
established obligation, another justification must be found, and nothing 
satisfactory has yet been supplied (1967:30). 
Of course, if one accepts the view that there are rights in 
controversial cases (which Dworkin has since been at pains to 
demonstrate), this problem seems to be solved, because there can be 
no retroactivity in enforcing a pre-existing (if not altogether pre-
established ) right. 
Another troublesome aspect of "discretion," raised this time in 
"Hard Cases," (1975; see also 1977d: 81-130) was its inconsistency 
with democratic notions of the separation of powers. Only elected 
officials, at least those without the security of tenure granted to 
judges, are supposed to "make" law. Judges are supposed merely to 
"apply" it: 
[A) community should be governed by men and women who are elected by 
and responsible to the majority. Since judges are, for the most part, not 
elected, and since they are not, in practice, responsible to the electorate in the 
way legislators are, it seems to compromise that proposition when judges make 
law (1977d: 84). 
The legal theory of controversial cases, therefore, could be consistent 
with democratic theory only if judges could be conceived of as 
enforcing pre-existing rights, or at least as enforcing rights which did 
not depend on the personal preferences of the judge deciding the case 
(1977d: 85). 
So Dworkin's theory (and the perspective adopted by it) 
provides conceptually reassuring answers to these two embarrassing 
features of controversial cases, and Hartian positivism is incapable 
of doing the same. If neatness were the test of philosophical validity, 
there is no question but that Dworkin would win. The problem, of 
course, is that beneath the neat concept ual surface Dworkin 
provides, the controversial case still leaves plenty to be embarrassed 
 
about. 
The main reason why people object to legal retroactivity is that it 
renders the full implications of their actions unpredictable. And 
whether or not there is a uniquely correct answer to any given point 
of law, the implications of an action touching on that point of law 
will remain unpredictable to the extent that one cannot be sure what 
it is and, more importantly, that the judge who ultimately decides the 
case will in fact reach it. By definition, the more controversial the 
case, the less sure one can be. Similarly, it is no answer to the 
objection from democratic theory that a judge can be conceived of as 
merely "applying" the law if he or she reaches the right 
conclusion unless the right conclusion is in fact reached. To the 
extent that the conclusion which a judge in fact reaches depends on 
which judge ultimately decides the case, the objection from 
democratic theory still holds. Again by definition, the more 
controversial the case, the more the outcome will in fact depend on 
which judge decides the case. 
It seems, then, that the "embarrassing" features of controversial 
cases remain even after Dworkin's theory is taken into account. That 
they are not eliminated by Hart's theory cannot, therefore, count 
against it and in favor of Dworkin's. But it should not surprise 
anyone that neither theory could get rid of them, because they 
cannot be gotten rid of. The most that could be hoped for is a 
theory or argument that would justify them. To do this, it would 
have to show that the system of deciding legal cases is in fact as 
predictable and impersonal as it possibly could be without 
sacrificing other, more important values. This would include 
showing, among other things, that judges are as well equipped and 
inclined to determine the right answer to questions of law as is 
humanly possible and that the structure of the legal system enables 
and encourages them to do so better than any alternative structure 
could. Neither Hart nor Dworkin has attempted to carry out such a 
programme. 
There is, however, one very important difference between the 
two theories which bears on these questions. It is that the elements 
of Dworkin's theory (lawyers' legal arguments and official 
justifications of judicial decisions) systematically exclude these 
embarrassing features, whereas the elements of Hart's theory 
(official and unofficial behavior and the internal and external 
attitudes manifested by that behavior) systematically include them. 
The choice, then, is between a theory which builds in the 
problematic aspects of the controversial case and one which builds 
them out. 
It is important to notice that though Dworkin's theory excludes the 
problems of predictability and judicial lawmaking as elements of the 
concept of legal rights in controversial cases, it does not, on its face, 
make them irrelevant or otherwise exclude the possibility of their 
being raised at all. We are not prevented, for example, from noting 
 
the divergence between official theory and practice, or from 
pointing out how unpredictable legal decisions may in fact be in a 
given legal system, or even from generalizing this into a critique of a 
whole system of adjudication if we are so minded and can back up our 
claims empirically. All we are prevented from doing is 
characterizing them in a particular way. Specifically, we are not to 
deny the status of a legal right to a claim on the sole ground that 
it cannot be predicted with confidence that it will be recognized by 
a court. Instead, we are to say such things as "X has a legal right, but 
it is not possible to predict whether he or she will be able to enforce 
it," and "Judge Y has a legal duty to decide this issue in that way, but 
there is no telling whether he or she is willing or able to do so" 
(presumably, we are to say such things even when we have good 
grounds for believing that a claim will be denied). 
This manner of speaking is familiar enough, at least to lawyers. It 
is not without its dangers, however, and they are of a kind very 
similar to those which Hart pointed out in Fuller's "narrow" conception 
of law discussed earlier. I have in mind the possibility that people will 
mistake their legal rights for their enforceable claims or the way judges 
justify their decisions for the way that they actually reach them. This 
would have the effect of inspiring a confidence in and lending a 
legitimacy to the legal system when it perhaps deserved neither. It may 
be that Dworkin's way of conceptualizing things does not enhance the 
likelihood of this happening,8 but it is worth noting that he himself 
seems to make precisely this sort of error in "Hard Cases." 
It will be remembered that the "Rights Thesis" presented in that 
article claims not only to prescribe how judges ought to decide 
controversial cases but also to describe how they actually do decide 
such cases. According to Dworkin, his theory is concerned with 
"judicial practice" and "explains the present structure of the 
institution of adjudication" (1977d: 123).  It argues that "judicial 
decisions . . . in hard cases, characteristically are . . . generated by 
principle. . . ." (1977d: 84). Andit is said to provide a more adequate 
"phenomenological account of the judicial decision" (1977d: 86) than 
other suggested theories. But of course, it does no such thing, 
because the only evidence offered for the thesis (and there  is very  
little of  it at that )  is officially  reported justifications of judicial 
decisions. Thus unless we assume, as if  the Realists  never  existed, 
that judicial  justifications accurately describe how judges actually 
reach their decisions, this · Rights Thesis is only a theory of how 
judges characteristically justify decisions, not how they reach them. 
Whether Dworkin makes such an assumption or merely considers 
the question irrelevant is impossible to tell. 
Another disturbing aspect of "Hard Cases" is the way in which 
the issue of the predictability of judicial decisions gets submerged in 
the principle of "articulate consistency" (1977d: 87-88).9 Now it is 
clear that there is a moral value in treating like cases alike, but there 
is also a moral value in making judicial decisions predictable. 
 
Occasionally, for example in controversial cases, these principles 
will conflict. This should call for some hard moral balancing, but for 
Dworkin it does not seem to do so, because predictability does not 
seem, for him, to have a separate moral value. In controversial cases, 
one of the opposing claimants will have to be taken by surprise, but 
all this means for Dworkin is that one of the claimants will have 
been unjustified in his or her expectations 10-unjustified in the sense 
that the expectations were not in accordance with the principle of 
articulate consistency. Apparently, one should not expect what one 
does not deserve. Maybe so, but people (if only the "bad men" 
among us) do have a tendency to rely on "hard facts," and the 
question of whether the legal system should strive for greater 
predictability as an end in itself deserves at least some attention. It is 
not unreasonable to postulate that Dworkin's refusal to give it any 
stems from his preoccupation with the internal point of view to the 
exclusion of everything else. 
These political and moral dangers inherent in Dworkin's 
theory of controversial cases lead to a final point. It is that a 
concept of legal rights in controversial cases which pushes from 
center stage the question of enforceability is not only dangerous, but 
also rather uninteresting from a scientific point of view. Legal rights 
only become interesting when they have some impact on human 
existence. Why anyone (aside from judges professionally concerned 
with putting their decisions on an acceptable footing) would want to 
study "legal rights" divorced from the question of whether they 
make any difference to the outcome of cases is more than a little 
puzzling. Even advocates, though they naturally will be concerned 
with the proper way to frame their arguments in court, will want 
also to know the likely impact of their arguments on the actual 
outcome of cases if they are to be of any use as advisers to 
prospective litigants. 
But judges, lawyers, and even litigants are not the only ones 
with interests in controversial cases. For the legal, political, or 
social theorist-indeed for anyone concerned with the human 
condition-the importance of the controversial case is that it signals a 
sort of crisis in the legal system. The crisis may consist of a 
contradiction between accepted past practice and what seems 
appropriate in the instant case or between opposing factions of the 
official community or both. In any event, it differs in character from 
the ordinary conflict of claims between representative claimants 
under settled rules with which a legal system deals every day, 
because it occurs at the official level. It is the way in which this 
crisis is resolved and the role official justification plays in its 
resolution that are the scientifically interesting things about it, not 
the internal consistency of the justification standing on its own. A 
concept of legal rights in controversial cases that is restricted to 
the internal consistency of official justification is of no use in 
investigating these questions. Worse than that, it actually obliterates 
 
the uniqueness of the controversial case by denying that the 
existence of a crisis can ever be anything more than apparent. 
Every case has a correct answer; it is just that in some cases the 
right answer is not widely recognized. 
If all this seems rather abstract, perhaps an example will help to 
clarify matters. In one of the most controversial cases of recent 
American constitutional jurisprudence, Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke, 1978, the Supreme Court of the United States 
struck down the admissions program of a California medical school 
which had reserved a quota of its places for historically deprived 
racial minorities. In a split decision, the Court ordered that Bakke, a 
white who had been refused admission under the program, be admitted. 
Before the case was decided, Dworkin had argued quite convincingly 
that Bakke had "no case" either morally or (therefore) legally (1977e: 11). 
After it was decided, Dworkin argued with impeccable lawyer's skill 
that, technically speaking, the Bakke decision did not even settle the 
question of whether the precise program involved in the case is 
forbidden under American law (1978a: 20). 
How would Dworkin have us describe the post-Bakke situation? 
Shall we say, as his theory seems to dictate, that in the United States 
all schools (including the school involved in Bakke itself) have the 
legal right to do what was forbidden in Bakke? Shall we leave this 
statement unqualified by the impossibility of predicting how the 
next case will in fact turn out? Would such an unqualified statement 
be of any value, except to mislead, outside of a courtroom? If not, 
shall we not follow Hart and say that in theory there is such a right 
but we shall have to wait and see whether it becomes a reality? 
It should be clear by now that what is necessary is a concept of 
legal rights in controversial cases that makes such issues as 
enforceability and the interplay between legal theory and legal 
practice as important as official justification, a concept that includes 
both the internal and the external points of view. In other words, it 
makes all the moral, political and scientific sense in the world for 
legal philosophy to deny the status of legal rights to those claims 
for which it cannot be predicted with confidence that they will 
actually be enforced even if, according to the ground rules of the 
legal system concerned, or any other normative system, they ought 
to be enforced. 
 
VI. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE BEYOND THE 
CONTROVERSIAL CASE 
At the beginning of this essay, I suggested that though Dworkin 
has developed his attack on the external perspective for the narrow 
purpose of defending his theory of legal rights in controversial cases, 
it is in fact impossible to restrict it thus. This is partly for the 
obvious reason that a theory of legal rights in controversial cases 
logically entails a whole theory of legal rights and also a whole 
theory of law. But it is also because the same methodological issue 
 
of theoretical perspective which arises on the "micro" level of 
controversial cases also arises in connection with the larger questions 
which have traditionally been of concern to legal philosophers. In 
fact, it is at the "macro" level that the inadequacies of a theory of law 
based on a purely internal perspective manifest themselves most 
clearly for the same political, moral, and scientific reasons which 
counsel against the exclusion of the external perspective from the 
issue of legal rights in controversial cases. Again, it is not merely that 
there are important questions which need to be asked about law, 
apart from internal questions about the law of any given legal 
system; it is that these questions can best be asked through the 
vehicle of a concept of law which includes both internal and 
external perspectives. 
I want briefly to allude to three types of issues which illustrate 
this point. None of them, it will be noticed, can do without answers 
to the internal questions of what the law is; but, equally, none of 
them can do without an external perspective. 
The first is a variation on the theme of the divergence between 
theory and practice mentioned earlier. It is a widely acknowledged 
contribution of the so-called American Legal Realist school of 
jurisprudence to have drawn attention to the fact that officially stated 
rules and justifications of judicial decisions do not always correspond 
precisely to the actions taken in their name. Indeed, some of the types of 
reasons given by common law judges for their decisions have been 
found to be incapable of motivating those decisions (cf. Stone, 1964: 
240-280). Naturally, if one were to restrict the study of law to these 
rules and justifications, one would not be aware of this rather important 
fact. This is not, of course, an objection to Dworkin's position. For, as 
was mentioned earlier in connection with controversial cases, there is 
nothing in it to prevent one from noting the degree to which theory is 
not actually applied in practice or from making this the subject of 
scientific study and theoretical debate. Of course, in Dworkin's view 
we would have to call the theory "law" and the practice something 
else, but this too would be all right, as long as the point was merely 
that in some legal systems on some occasions practice did not accord 
with theory. 
Where Dworkin's point of view proves inadequate is in the realm of 
the more fundamental claim that the divergence between theory and 
practice is an inevitable feature of law in general and not just a 
problem of some legal systems. This, it seems to me, is the most 
important aspect of such statements as "the constitution is what the 
judges say it is." Such statements emphatically draw attention to the 
personal responsibility of the officials of any legal system for their 
actions and oppose the ideology of complete impersonality which 
many legal systems seem to have found useful. A theory of law which 
adopts a purely internal point of view is dangerous, because it sidesteps 
such claims a priori as theoretical misconceptions instead of meeting 
them head on and, to the extent necessary, accommodating them. 
 
Furthermore, insofar as such claims are true, "law" is artifically 
divorced from the real impact of legal systems on the lives of the 
people subject to them and ceases to be an object of interest 
outside of legal trade schools. 
Leaving room within the concept of law for an analysis of the 
divergence between theory and practice is also necessary in order to 
appreciate the full range of interplay between the two, especially 
the role which theory seems to play fo the legitimation of practice. 
From Dworkin's purely internal point of view, one must take theory 
("law") on its own terms. It can be right or wrong (that is to say 
consistent or inconsistent with conventional and institutional 
morality) in the abstract, but it 
can have no other function than to motivate practice . This, after 
all, is how judges present the doctrine they write: as ''reasons" for 
making the decisions they make. On the other hand, to conceive of 
official doctrine and legal theory as rationalizing practice or 
rendering it acceptable requires an external perspective. 
Consequently, a claim that an important function of theory in any 
legal system is ideological and that this is an essential feature of 
law in general, an aspect of its "nature," cannot be made within 
Dworkin's conceptual framework, no matter how strong the basis for 
the claim.11 
The divergence between theory and practice on the one hand 
and their interplay on the other might be characterized as "formal" 
issues in that they are not directly concerned with the "content" or 
substance of law. Yet there are substantive issues, too, for which a 
concept of law restricted to an internal perspective is inadequate. 
The one I want to mention here, generally associated with Marxism, 
though not restricted to it, concerns what might be called the 
"historical nature of law." 
Many claims can be made (and, if true, accommodated) within a 
theory such as Dworki.n's about the historical role of laws or even of 
certain legal systems from time to time and place to place. They may 
be said to have promoted justice or injustice, happiness or 
unhappiness, or even to have benefited one class at the expense of 
others. The problem arises, as usual, with claims of a more fundamental 
sort- for example, the cluster of Marxist claims (roughly) that the 
content and form  of  law  vary  according  to  certain  definite  historical 
developments in the mode of material production; that, indeed, the 
very existence of law depends on the division of society into 
classes; and that, consequently, the achievement of a classless society 
upon the demise of the capitalist mode of production will lead to 
the disappearance of law altogether. 
No doubt these are very controversial claims, and it is not my 
intention to defend them here. I merely want to point out that they 
are absolutely incompatible with a concept of law restricted to the 
i!lternal perspective, that is to say restricted to the self-concept of 
legal systems.12 No theory which seeks to transcend or oppose this 
 
self-concept, to regard it critically as merely an aspect of law and 
not the whole story, can even be articulated within a concept of law 
that excludes the external perspective . 
It bears emphasizing that the necessity of including an external 
perspective in the concept of law does not depend on claims of the 
general sort just discussed being true, merely on their being 
arguable. And if it is arguable that laws and legal systems are not all 
or only that which they themselves claim to be, then, to paraphrase 
Hart, there is nothing to be gained and much lost in conceding by 
definition that they are. 
 
VII. DWORKIN AND HIS CRITICS 
Since writing "No Right Answer" and "Can Rights be 
Controversial?" Dworkin has had some further thoughts on the 
methodological issues which I have been discussing. Though 
admittedly incomplete,  they bear brief  mention  if only to confirm  the  
importance  of  the  problem  of  theoretical perspective to an 
understanding of his work. 
In a reply to an article by Stephen R. Munzer, (1977c: 10601068), 
Dworkin brings to life the imagined dialogue between the "empiricist 
philosopher" and the judges, discussed earlier (1977c: 1246-1250; see 
also 1978b: 331-338). Munzer had argued that even if there were a 
unique right answer to controversial questions of law, it would still 
be incorrect to claim that when judges decide hard cases the rights 
announced in their opinions exist before their decisions are handed 
down. This was because the only practical interest attaching to the 
classification of a right as either pre-existing or newly created 
concerned whether or not there was advance notice of the right, "an 
important aspect of fairness." Since "controversial rights" could not 
give notice by definition, then they should not be classified as pre-
existing. 
Munzer did not relate his point to a general theory of theoretical 
perspective; so Dworkin, like the judges, saw only two alternatives. 
Either Munzer was saying, as an internal statement of law (or 
morals), that only those rights exist which are uncontroversial or 
clearly identifiable in advance, or he was calling for the "reform of 
our legal system" and "proposing a new theory of legal rights, 
according to which a party simply does not have a legal right unless 
he is able to demonstrate to the satisfaction of all reasonable lawyers 
that he does" (1977c: 1249). But it seems obvious that Munzer did 
not want to make either of these points but rather to argue, as I 
argued earlier, that the classification of a legal right or duty as "pre-
existing" from the standpoint of legal philosophy requires 
consideration of factors outside of the official theory of the system 
in question. One such factor is the degree to which the right or duty 
could have been ascertained in advance, because one of the main 
reasons people concern themselves about the preexistence of rights 
 
and duties is to evaluate the fairness of official action. It counts 
against the fairness of an action if those affected by it were not 
given sufficient advance notice to organize their affairs in light of it. 
More significant than Dworkin's reply to Munzer are more recent 
remarks provoked by an article by E. Philip Soper (1977: 473).13  In 
them, Dworkin reflects for a few brief pages on just what it is that he 
is trying to do with the non-normative side of his Rights Thesis. He 
denies that it is merely "empirical generalization, linguistic study 
[or] linguistic exhortation." Nevertheless he says that it is 
"conceptual" like other "theories of law" in the sense that it is a 
defence of "a particular conception of a concept." While he says that 
he does not "pretend to have yet given an adequate or even clear 
account of that activity,'' he elaborates it in the following way: 
We all-at least all lawyers-share a concept of law and of legal right, and we 
contest . different conceptions of that concept. Positivism defends a particular 
conception, and I have tried to defend a competing conception . . . I concentrate 
on the details of a particular legal system with which I am especially familiar, 
not simply to show that positivism provides a poor account of that system, 
but to show that positivism provides a poor conception of the concept of a 
legal right . . . . Positivists and I do not dispute about details of practice that 
could be settled by looking more carefully to see what is said in books, or 
by framing more intelligent questionnaires for judges. We may disagree 
about matters of that sort, but this disagreement is not fundamental. We 
fundamentally disagree about what our practice comes to, that is, about which 
philosophical account of the practice is superior (1978b: 
351-352). 
One hesitates to read very much into a passage so tentatively 
expressed. However, it does seem to mark a departure from the 
methodological dogmatism of "No Right Answer,'' "Can Rights be 
Controversial?" and Dworkin's reply to Munzer. It is at least clear that 
Dworkin now recognizes that some of the issues between himself and 
his philosophical opponents are methodological ones. 
Of course, Dworkin has not yet suggested how these issues might 
be resolved. He does seem to rule out, under the heading of 
"linguistic exhortation,'' the suggestion that "positivism . . . proposes 
that legal concepts should be used in a certain way, for clarity, 
convenience or for some political motive" (1978b: 351). But this 
may merely mean that Dworkin does not take the claim of positivism 
to be a call for the reform of lawyers' language for any of the 
reasons mentioned; certainly, this interpretation would be consistent 
with the emphasis on "linguistic" and the deprecating phrase 
"simply hortatory." However, it may mean that in the choice of a 
conception of law (including its theoretical perspective) clarity, 
convenience, and politics are all irrelevant. If this is Dworkin's point, 




The problem of theoretical perspective is not peculiar to the 
philosophy of law. It can be found at the threshhold of all social 
theory, arising as it does from the inevitable variation in meaning 
 
which social events have among the different participants in them. 
No doubt the range of possible perspectives is infinitely more varied 
than the simple dichotomy made use of here between "internal" 
and "external."14 But this only serves to emphasize the main point, 
which is that the proper perspective for the theorist to adopt is not 
predetermined. It remains a matter of choice, or, as F.E. Sparshott 
has written: 
This compound problem, of the nature of man and of his world, is not a factual 
one but deliberative: one to be settled, that is, not by finding things out but 
by making up one's mind. There are, of course, hard facts that determine 
what answers to the question are admissible, but it is not these facts that are 
in question. There are many ways in which, many aspects under which, we 
men can think about ourselves, and about the world considered as our 
environment, without committing detectable errors of fact. So the question 
"What is man?" becomes "What shall we make of man?" (1972: 110-111). 
Of course, we are not entirely free, even within the limits of the 
hard facts, to make what we will of "man" or of the world. On the 
contrary, we are everywhere hemmed in by moral, political, and 
scientific considerations of the sort I have relied upon here to make 
out the case for an external perspective in the concept of law. 
Indeed, this is what was meant by the statement made earlier that 
Dworkin fails in his attempt to exclude the external perspective 
because of its importance for the philosophy of law. What we make 
of the concept of law is a matter of choice, but we cannot afford to 
choose as Dworkin does. 
All of this is not to say that a perspective such as that 
adopted by Dworkin may not suffice for some legitimate concerns 
about laws and legal systems. But it is clear that for many it will 
not. Dworkin's mistake is to assume that his concerns are the only 






1 See, for example, A.A. Ehrenzweig, Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence (1971: 51-72) 
for such a theory of the Hart/Fuller debate. A good discussion of the "place of goals 
and motives in philosophy" may be found in J.O. Wisdom, Philosophy and its Place in 
our Culture (1975: Ch. 22). 
2 The notion  of an internal and external perspective will be familiar to students 
of ethics. A recent example of its use is the discussion of the institution of promising in 
Mackie (1977: 66-73). 
3 When I was a child waiting outside a movie theatre one Saturday afternoon I 
asked a ragged passerby something like "Hey Mister, what's the time?" to which he 
replied in measured tones, finger upraised, "Time is the space betweeri two thoughts!' 
There is much in the Dworkin/Hart  dispute which resembles this exchange. 
4 See also MacPherson (1978: 201): "Political concepts are generally shaped by 
theorists who are not simply grammarians or logicians but who are seeking to justify  
something." 
5 An earlier essay, "Judicial Discretion" (1963), contains many  of  the ideas of 
Dworkin's later work in embryo. However, they are kept within somewhat more modest 
confines. There is no attack on Hart or on ''positivism" or any pretension to a "theory of 
law" as opposed to a theory of the judicial decision. This piece was not included in the 
collection Taking Rights Seriously, (1977d) which begins with "The Model of Rules I." 
6 Riggs v. Palmer (115 N.Y. 506 (1889]); murderer of testator held incapable of 
inheriting under will. 
7 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. (32 N.J. 358 [1960] ); manufacturer 
held liable for personal injuries due to defective goods in spite of contract limiting 
liability. 
B Though if Dworkin's empirical observation at the beginning of "Judicial 
Discretion" (1963: 624) is correct, one wonders where ''the layman" got his ideas: 
To the layman  a lawsuit or a trial is an event in which a judge 
determines a controversy by application of established principles, rather than 
new principles invented to dispose of the case. He knows that individual 
judges may fail this ideal of justice; but he believes such failures to be 
aberrations, their occurrence marking injustice rather than its opposite. To him 
judges should and in general do, in the words of the admittedly metaphorical 
maxim, find the la,w and not make it. The layman's respect for law is 
founded in large part on his view that this is a fair method of deciding 
controversies. 
9 Articulate consistency is a demand of "the doctrine of political responsibility 
." It requires that judges and other political officials make only those decisions 
which they can justify within a political theory which also justifies the other 
decisions they have made or propose to make. Dworkin uses it to explain ''the special 
concern that judges show for both precedents and hypothetical examples." This is 
why, according to Dworkin, judges treat the actual holding of a case with more 
respect than the reasons given for it. 
io "If . . .the plaintiff's claim is doubtful, then the court must, to some extent, 
surprise one or another of the parties; and if the court decides that on balance the 
plaintiff's argument is stronger, then it will also decide that the plaintiff was, on 
balance, more justified in his expectations" (1977d: 86). 
11 In Raz's taxonomy of the functions of law, this figures as an "indirect social 
function." Of the general category, Raz writes:"the indirect effects of the law as 
conceived here are.far from being relatively unimportant by-products of the law. They 
are part of its essential function in any society" (Raz, 1973:299). 
12   Cf. Marx, 1859, reprinted in Bottomore and Rubel (1964: 51-52): At a 
certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in 
society come in conflict with the existing relations of production,  or-what 
is but  a legal expression  for the  same thing-with the property  
relations  within which  they had  been at work before.  From forms of 
development  of the forces of production these relations turn into their 
fetters.  Then occurs a period of social revolution.  With the change of 
the economic foundation  the  entire immense  superstructure  is more  or 
less rapidly  transformed.  In  considering  such  transformations  the 
distinction   should   always   be   made   between   the   material 
transformation of the economic conditions of production which can be 
determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal,  political ,  
religious,  aesthetic  or  philosophical-in  short ideological-forms  in  
which  men  become   conscious  of  this conflict and fight it out.  Just 
as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks o/ 
himself, so can we not judge  of such a period  of transformation by its 
own consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness  must rather be 
explained from the  contradictions  of  material  life, from  the  existing  
conftict between  the  social forces  of production  and the relations  of 
production.  (emphasis added) 
13 Dworkin's methodological comments do not seem connected to any of the 
arguments made by Soper, so they (the arguments) will not be repeated here. 
Dworkin's reply is in "A Reply to Critics" (1978b); and the passage with which I am 
concerned commences at p. 350. 
14 Unger draws the distinction between "the standpoint of the agent [and) the 
perspective of the observer-subjective and objective meaning" and analyzes the 
problem of theoretical perspective in this way: 
If we disregard the meanings an act has for its author and for the other 
members of the society to which he belongs, we run the risk of losing sight of 
what is peculiarly social in the conduct we are trying to understand. If, 
however, we insist on sticking close to the reflective understanding of the 
agent or his fellows, we are deprived of a standard by which to distinguish 
insight from illusion or to rise above the self-images of different ages and 
societies, through comparison. Thus, subjective and objective meaning must 
somehow both be taken into account (1976: 15, 19). 
*  These articles are included in Taking Rights Seriously, 1977. 
**   This article is included in the 1977 paperback  edition only, under the title "A 
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